Ex-Navy leaders: USS Hartford crash could signal systemic problems

Groton - Former Navy leaders say the USS Hartford's collision with a Navy ship may indicate a larger problem: the need to reinforce professionalism and curb an overreliance on technology.

The Hartford crash was the latest in a string of incidents involving American submarines and surface ships in recent years, including several in the Middle East.

"It was a lapse in professional conduct and that was also a factor in some of the incidents I'm familiar with," said retired Master Chief Terry D. Scott, a former Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, the service's most senior enlisted member. "I'm not in position to say it was a factor in all, but it was a factor in some."

The investigative report issued on the collision between the Groton-based Hartford (SSN 768) and a Navy amphibious ship, the USS New Orleans, in the Strait of Hormuz on March 20 described the informal culture onboard the Hartford.

Sailors operating the submarine would occasionally fall asleep on the job, spend too much time away from their stations and chat informally while working. Scott said he had not read the Hartford investigation and based his opinions on press reports.

"If technology is getting better and we have so much more data available to tell our sailors exactly where in the world they are, and exactly where in the world other ships are, how come this improved data doesn't appear to be leading toward a reduced number of incidences?" asked Sean Sullivan, a retired Navy captain and former commander of the Naval Submarine Base in Groton.

Litany of recent incidents

In 2001, the USS Greeneville surfaced underneath a Japanese fishing vessel during a training exercise near Hawaii. The following year, it struck a U.S. Navy amphibious ship.

The USS Oklahoma City surfaced under a freighter in the Strait of Gibraltar in 2002, the USS Philadelphia collided with a Turkish merchant vessel in the Arabian Sea in 2005 and the USS Newport News hit a Japanese merchant vessel in the Persian Gulf in 2007.

Advances in technology may have led to reductions in critical thinking, Sullivan said.

"There's a tendency to look at a screen or a monitor that shows you a picture of where your ship is and just sort of believe it," he said. "In the old days, you didn't have that picture unless you formed it in your head, and so the one you formed in your head was the result of the critical thinking you had to apply."

The Navy needs to evaluate its technology and training, "so that in spite of the new technology, sailors can look at the data and correctly analyze it whether they have their shoes on or not," Sullivan said, referencing the Hartford investigation finding that sailors driving the ship would sometimes take their shoes off.

Naval leaders gathered in McLean, Va., last month for the Naval Submarine League's annual symposium. The theme this year was "Submariners Getting Back to Basics."

Adm. Kirkland H. Donald, director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, quoted a Major League Baseball manager who said the key to winning was "pitching, fundamentals and three-run homers."

"The Force has a great bullpen and a bench full of long-ball hitters," Donald said, according to a transcript of the speech. "Combined with fundamentals, the basics, there is no limit to how far we can go."

The nuclear Navy, Donald said, is faced with the challenge of "achieving uniformly uncompromising standards of integrity and operational competency," and in the wake of recent incidents "it became apparent we needed to do more in our training pipeline and in the fleet to raise the understanding and relevancy of integrity."

'A warning sign'

Norman Polmar, a naval historian and submarine warfare expert, said the nuclear community "gets the creme de la creme of Navy personnel" and "when the most sophisticated community in the Navy has to say 'we have to get back to basics,' that's a warning sign."

"I'm wondering if it has to do with the way the nuclear community is run," Polmar said. "Twenty years ago, you rarely heard of problems like we hear of today. I don't like the term systemic, but I'm wondering if it is something bigger than a few isolated cases."

Polmar suggested an external investigation to get at the root of the recent problems, which include the collisions and an incident on the USS Hampton where sailors did not do daily safety checks on the submarine's nuclear reactor and falsified records to make it appear that the work had been done, according to Navy officials.

Vice Adm. John J. Donnelly, commander of the Submarine Force, ordered a review of submarine accidents since 2001 to discern common themes. His spokesman, Cmdr. Patrick W. McNally, said the review has been completed but he could not discuss the findings for "operational security reasons."

"You always have to be on the tip-top of your training schedule, make sure everyone is wide awake and alert," said retired Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, who served as the Chief of Naval Operations, the highest ranking officer in the Navy, from 1986 to 1990. "Accidents sneak up on you when you least expect them. You can never ease up on your standards."

Scott, who retired in 2006 after 29 years in the Navy, also sees a need to "reinforce the principles that the submarine service has operated on for years" and to "not become complacent and allow distractions to get in the way of proper submarining."

There is a system within the Submarine Force to publicize the lessons learned from mistakes, Scott said, but there is also "regretfully, a tendency to learn some lessons more than once."

j.grogan@theday.com