For years, short-term political calculations took priority over planning for the future when it came to the state’s employee pension plan. By shortchanging contributions to the pension, governors and legislatures alike, of both political persuasions, were able to spend money elsewhere and, at times, but certainly not all the time, avoid tax increases.

It is the primary reason why Connecticut has only saved enough to meet 43 percent of its pension obligations. Due to the demands of Wall Street rating agencies and the reality that the future has arrived and pensioners must be paid, political leaders are being forced to confront the problem.

According to an analysis conducted by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College for the administration of Gov. Dannel P. Malloy, Connecticut created a State Employees Retirement System in 1939, but the legislature did not start setting aside any money to meet its pension obligations until 1971, and even then not nearly enough.

Making matters worse, the older retirement plans were extremely generous. Pensions were later adjusted for new hires, making them more fiscally manageable, but those earlier gold-standard “legacy costs” are driving much of the shortfall.

And rather than pushing the legislature to close the gap, state employee unions at times accepted reductions in contributions in return for other short-term benefits, perhaps calculating that the state would have no choice but to make up the difference and meet its obligations later.

Also, in trying to paint a rosy picture and reduce what it had to set aside, the state often assumed a rate of return on investment that was unrealistic.

The result of all this pension fund mismanagement was an $11 billion growth in the unfunded pension liability since 2000, the pension research center concluded, for a total unfunded liability of $12.5 billion.

If Connecticut had made its annual required contribution (ARC) it would be doing far better but would still have a problem, the analysis found. This is due to factors that could not be as easily controlled, including deviations from actuarial predictions and disappointing investment returns. If the state had contributed 100 percent of the ARC, Connecticut’s funded ratio would only be about 62 percent, far better than 43 percent, but below the national average of 72 percent, the analysis determined.

Now what happens? Several ideas are circulating, which is an improvement over decades of the ignore-it-and-let-someone-else-deal-with-it-later approach.

The pension analysis calculated that if Connecticut sets aside necessary funding, the $1.5 billion pension contribution this fiscal year would grow to $6.65 billion in 2032, then begin to dramatically decline. Since the state budget is $20 billion, meeting that obligation would either require massive tax increases or eliminating entire departments.

The Malloy administration instead is recommending that the contribution be raised to $2 billion by the 2018-2019 fiscal year and stay there. That would extend the payback over a much longer period of time, but keep the contribution manageable.

The rating agency Standard & Poor’s is skeptical, saying the plan is not aggressive enough in addressing the unfunded liability and could lead to a downgrade in Connecticut’s credit rating, boosting the cost of borrowing just as the governor proposes undertaking a massive transportation initiative.

Comptroller Kevin P. Lembo has proposed a variation of the administration’s idea, capping the annual pension contribution at $2.3 billion through 2033. Connecticut would then face payments in excess of $1 billion for eight years after 2033. The good news is that over time the situation approves as the obligations tied to those legacy plans diminish.

Finally, Treasurer Denise Nappier calls for tougher medicine short term. Her office calculates that if Connecticut stays the course in closing the funding pension, the obligation will peak at $4.7 billion in 2032, not the $6.65 billion estimated in the administration’s analysis. The pension obligation will then rapidly decline and the state will save billions of dollars long term compared to the Malloy and Lembo plans that spread out the repayment.

All these proposals involve complicated math, divergent assumptions on rates of return on investment, and expectations that future legislatures and administrations, unlike their predecessors, will stay the course.

Some form of the Malloy or Lembo plans, massaged to keep the rating agencies happy, stand the best chance of adoption. It is hard to imagine the legislature managing the size of the contributions envisioned by Nappier’s office — equal to nearly one-quarter of the current budget.

That there is finally a serious discussion taking place is progress. There is no good solution, but there has to be some solution.

Paul Choiniere is the editorial page editor.

p.choiniere@theday.com

Twitter: @Paul_Choiniere