Susan Bysiewicz and her attorney, Wesley W. Horton, were in perfect agreement on Thursday on the question of her qualifications to serve as attorney general. Bysiewicz has racked up the requisite ten years' worth of "active practice" of law in Connecticut to qualify her for the post, they said. But they weren't at all consistent on the other argument of the lawsuit they filed Thursday. That suit charges that it is a violation of the state constitution for the legislature to pass any law imposing conditions or restrictions on who may serve as attorney general. The only way to do that, Horton said, was via a constitutional amendment.

But they weren't at all consistent on the other argument of the lawsuit they filed Thursday. That suit charges that it is a violation of the state constitution for the legislature to pass any law imposing conditions or restrictions on who may serve as attorney general. The only way to do that, Horton said, was via a constitutional amendment. His client, however, continually suggested something different.

His client, however, continually suggested something different. The language in the existing statute that requires the ten years of service is in "conflict" with the constitution, said Bysiewicz.

The language in the existing statute that requires the ten years of service is in "conflict" with the constitution, said Bysiewicz. But she added, "Personally I have no problem with the legislature putting requirements in. But I do think that the one they put in back in 1897 directly conflicts with the 1980 amendment to the Connecticut constitution."

But she added, "Personally I have no problem with the legislature putting requirements in. But I do think that the one they put in back in 1897 directly conflicts with the 1980 amendment to the Connecticut constitution." "Since I served in the legislature, I can tell you what the legislators could then do should they decide," Bysiewicz continued. "They could decide to have a residency and a bar admission requirement. They could decide to shorten the active practice requirement. There are a lot of things they could then do if they wanted to address it."

"Since I served in the legislature, I can tell you what the legislators could then do should they decide," Bysiewicz continued. "They could decide to have a residency and a bar admission requirement. They could decide to shorten the active practice requirement. There are a lot of things they could then do if they wanted to address it." If that sounds a little strange, it should. Bysiewicz' own lawsuit contends that the existing law passed to impose restrictions on who can serve in the position is unconstitutional. And, standing right next to her, Horton reaffirmed his view that any such restriction would be unconstitutional if imposed by the legislature and the governor, since the attorney general is generally considered a constitutional office.

If that sounds a little strange, it should. Bysiewicz' own lawsuit contends that the existing law passed to impose restrictions on who can serve in the position is unconstitutional. And, standing right next to her, Horton reaffirmed his view that any such restriction would be unconstitutional if imposed by the legislature and the governor, since the attorney general is generally considered a constitutional office. The legislature can't say that any qualifying attributes are necessary for the job, Horton argued, other than the one implied in the name.

The legislature can't say that any qualifying attributes are necessary for the job, Horton argued, other than the one implied in the name. "You cannot have any qualifications unless they're inherent in the title itself, and inherent in the title of attorney general is that you're an attorney," he said.

"You cannot have any qualifications unless they're inherent in the title itself, and inherent in the title of attorney general is that you're an attorney," he said. During a circuitous round of questioning, Bysiewicz didn't explain why her view of the constitutionality of placing legislative restrictions on who can serve as attorney general differed from her lawyer's.

During a circuitous round of questioning, Bysiewicz didn't explain why her view of the constitutionality of placing legislative restrictions on who can serve as attorney general differed from her lawyer's. Meanwhile, the constitutionality claim doesn't just put Bysiewicz and Horton at odds with Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, who has already said he believes the legislature can specify job requirements for constitutional positions.

Meanwhile, the constitutionality claim doesn't just put Bysiewicz and Horton at odds with Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, who has already said he believes the legislature can specify job requirements for constitutional positions. It's also contradicted by those who say there's an existing and relevant court decision: the 1968 Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Adams v. Rubinow. In that case, the court rejected a claim by a probate judge that the legislature violated the constitution in seeking to pass laws changing procedures in the probate court system. (See the decision

It's also contradicted by those who say there's an existing and relevant court decision: the 1968 Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Adams v. Rubinow. In that case, the court rejected a claim by a probate judge that the legislature violated the constitution in seeking to pass laws changing procedures in the probate court system. (See the decision here.) The argument, Rep. Michael Lawlor said Thursday, turned in part on the question of whether probate courts are constitutional courts -- and therefore subject to alteration only by constitutional amendment. This, essentially, is Horton's argument about the office of the attorney general, which is often referred to as a constitutional office, along with the positions of governor, lieutenant governor, comptroller, secretary of the state and senator and representative.

The argument, Rep. Michael Lawlor said Thursday, turned in part on the question of whether probate courts are constitutional courts -- and therefore subject to alteration only by constitutional amendment. This, essentially, is Horton's argument about the office of the attorney general, which is often referred to as a constitutional office, along with the positions of governor, lieutenant governor, comptroller, secretary of the state and senator and representative. But to be considered a constitutional office, the Adams decision holds, an office must be specifically established by the constitution, by listing the responsibilities and scope of the office.

But to be considered a constitutional office, the Adams decision holds, an office must be specifically established by the constitution, by listing the responsibilities and scope of the office. The office of the attorney general is not established in that way in the constitution, Lawlor said. Like the probate courts in Adams, the attorney general position had existed for years but wasn't mentioned in earlier versions of the state constitution. And the reference to the post that was first added to the constitution in 1970 simply specifies that it is one of the positions for which an election must be held every four years. The language that spells out what the office is for and what its powers are is a legislative statute, not part of the constitution.

The office of the attorney general is not established in that way in the constitution, Lawlor said. Like the probate courts in Adams, the attorney general position had existed for years but wasn't mentioned in earlier versions of the state constitution. And the reference to the post that was first added to the constitution in 1970 simply specifies that it is one of the positions for which an election must be held every four years. The language that spells out what the office is for and what its powers are is a legislative statute, not part of the constitution. That, under the logic of Adams, means that it's not a constitutional office, and that the legislature is within its rights to pass laws governing what the office can do, and, presumably who can hold it.

That, under the logic of Adams, means that it's not a constitutional office, and that the legislature is within its rights to pass laws governing what the office can do, and, presumably who can hold it. It'll be interesting to see how that argument holds up against Horton's claim in the Bysiewicz suit.

It'll be interesting to see how that argument holds up against Horton's claim in the Bysiewicz suit.