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    Sunday, May 19, 2024

    Your Turn: Forecasting missed the boat during the Great Hurricane

    A photograph of the damage caused by the 1938 Hurricane, taken at the corner of Main Street and Pennsylvania Avenue with the Morton House to the left, one of many historical photographs of East Lyme that was on display at the East Lyme Public Library in 2014. (Day File Photo)

    Editor's Note: This is the first in a two-part series.

    For those who lived through it, the 1938 hurricane was one of those events that seems etched in memory.

    It was a monstrous storm, back before hurricanes were given names or assigned “categories,” and indeed when hurricanes rarely made landfall in the northeast. Its sudden approach that September afternoon, before the existence of weather satellites — or even television — took everyone along the Long Island and southeastern New England coasts by surprise, bringing devastation and approximately 700 fatalities.

    Nowadays, we have so much advance notice of severe hurricanes, we feel confident that by following forecasters’ advisories we will survive unscathed. Today’s up-to-the-minute satellite coverage — meteorological specifics such as the hurricane’s wind speed, direction, pressure readings, as well as contributing factors such as low and high pressure areas, approaching fronts, and tidal schedules — insures an accurate prediction of the precise path and severity of the entire event.

    And to drive home the potential severity of the imminent storm, we’re bombarded with TV coverage showing citizens stocking up on food, water, and batteries, others fueling up their cars,and business owners boarding up their windows.

    As exhausting as today’s pre-storm warnings and preparations can sometimes be, it is preferable to that which was available in the old days.

    The Hurricane of ‘38 had a forward speed estimated at between 60 and 70 mph, the fastest ever recorded at the time, prompting it to become known as The Long Island Express. It was located off the coast of Florida just 26 hours before it slammed into the south coast of Long Island.

    The U.S. Weather Bureau knew there was a tropical system out there; their “surprise” was the fact that it actually slammed into Long Island rather than veering off to the east, and that it was much larger and stronger than initially thought.

    The U.S. Weather Service (forerunner to the National Weather Service today) was tracking this storm’s journey almost from its formation off the coast of Africa as it traveled across the Atlantic Ocean. Because there were no satellite images or other modern technology to follow storms, forecasters had to rely on eyewitness sightings, most of them from various ships at sea that reported the strength, location, wind direction, and barometric pressure as they travelled over the waters. These reports were then relayed from one of many small U.S. Weather Bureau offices to another as the system progressed.

    As this hurricane passed north of Puerto Rico Sunday evening, Sept. 18, the Jacksonville office, believing it would hit Florida, issued storm warnings from Key West all the way up the coast to Jacksonville. By early Tuesday afternoon, Sept. 20, the storm, still offshore, was reported to be about 350 miles east of Daytona, Florida; the Jacksonville office predicted it would speed up and take a turn to the north or northeast.

    That office’s 9:30 p.m. advisory mentioned the “severe hurricane” moving due north and extended the storm warnings up the coast to Atlantic City, New Jersey. Florida residents breathed a big sigh of relief, but future storm tracking predictions were compromised because most mariners heeded the Weather Service’s instructions to stay off the water; very few sightings were reported from then on.

    The Jacksonville office’s last advisory at 7:30 a.m. Sept. 21 placed the storm approximately 140 miles off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The first advisory issued from the Washington office of the U.S. Weather Bureau at 9 a.m. called it a tropical storm and issued storm warnings as follows: northeast storm warnings north of Atlantic City, N.J., and south of Block Island and southeast storm warnings from Block Island to Eastport, Maine.

    This is important because in a tropical cyclone (as with every low-pressure system), the winds rotate around the center in a counterclockwise direction. This advisory indicates that with a “northeast storm warning” the winds will be coming out of the northeast; similarly, a “southeast storm warning” means the winds will be coming out of the southeast.

    Knowing this, when placing that system with those wind directions over a map of the area in question, it is easy to see that the National Weather Service’s Washington office indicated that this storm would be turning to the northeast and away from the New England coast. And that was the prediction; but there was one individual in that Washington office who disagreed. Charles H. Pierce concluded that the hurricane would not curve to the northeast but would instead continue due north.

    He had been a research forecaster for the previous five years but only employed in this office for less than a year. The senior meteorologists overruled Pierce’s prediction, rationalizing their decision with the fact that hurricanes very rarely hit New England but rather normally curve to the northeast and out to sea.

    I wonder if Pierce’s youth, relative inexperience, or being the newest member of this Washington team had anything to do with his theory being rejected. Whatever the reason, in the end, I suppose you could say that everyone except Charlie Pierce was surprised.

    Extensive analysis and evaluation continued long after the hurricane to help scientists better understand the insufficiencies regarding this forecasting and to improve their proficiency going forward.

    In addition to its forward speed and incorrect forecast, that analysis has revealed a few other factors that exacerbated the impact from the Long Island Express.

    First, enormous amounts of rain had fallen in the few days prior to the hurricane’s landfall, saturating the ground and raising concerns of major river flooding.

    Second, the autumnal equinox caused tides to be higher than normal.

    Third, the storm made landfall on the south shore of Long Island only a couple of hours before high tide, increasing the impact of the storm surge. Finally, all the extensive “post hurricane analysis” indicated that the Long Island Express was equivalent to a Category 5 while churning up the waters off the coast of Puerto Rico, and had weakened to a Category 3 by the time it made landfall on Long Island.

    It was such a devastating event, there continues to be much information available about that hurricane — books, TV programs, scientific papers — examining all aspects of that horrible day.

    Ellen Fortier lives in East Lyme.

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