In the spirit of historical introspection of our past, as recommended by none other than the Smithsonian Institution, one might ask why Colonel William Ledyard kept his civilian-soldiers cooped up in Fort Griswold like sitting ducks on Sept. 6, 1781, knowing full well they were heavily outnumbered and sure to be annihilated by professional, well-trained British killers in the Battle of Groton Heights.

Why not disperse throughout the countryside and fight like the colonists at Lexington and Concord who sought the cover of rocks, trees, fences and hills?

Their use of “irregular fighting,” or “frontier tactics,” called guerrilla warfare today, was the opposite of the orderly, linear columns of attack that the British used during the American Revolution.

In the years leading up to the attack on New London and Groton, rebel commanders like Francis Marion, “The Swamp Fox,” used frontier tactics with great success against the British in South Carolina and elsewhere.

Might the tragic Fort Griswold massacre been avoided through a similar strategy?

There is a striking lack of consensus among historians on the subject of guerrilla warfare in the Revolution. Some say it was seldom employed and had little impact on the war, while others say it had a significant impact.

Max Boot, author of Invisible Armies, interviewed on NPR’s “Morning Edition” radio show, said “ ... the American Revolution is in many ways a turning point in the history of guerrilla warfare” that “took a devastating toll on the British regiment” at Lexington in 1775.

Wyatt Redd, author of “How Francis Marion’s Revolutionary Use Of Guerrilla Warfare Changed Military Tactics Forever,” claims “the Americans made very effective use of tactics that we’d recognize today as guerrilla warfare,” and Marion’s tactics “... provided significant contributions towards the cause of independence.”

Many others agree with Redd, including John Oller, author of “The Swamp Fox, How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution,” who writes that Marion “would not jeopardize his men’s lives by sending them into battle hopelessly outnumbered.”

Even George Washington was the victim of guerrilla warfare in the French and Indian War when he served under the British. Later, his own skirmishing teams used such tactics.

On the very morning of the Battle of Groton Heights, the similarly outnumbered New London defenders used frontier tactics.

In her “History of New London 1860,” Francis Caulkins describes how they “concealed themselves behind rocks and fences, and annoyed the troops whenever they could find a chance.”

The Groton landscape was surely rugged enough to provide adequate coverage for hidden riflemen. The British struggled against the terrain to travel from Eastern Point to Fort Griswold. Some troops and artillery became “... entangled among the ledges, copses (small groups of trees) and ravines, (and) did not reach the fort until after the conflict had ceased.” (Caulkins)

Colonel Ledyard had plenty of time to stage any type of defense. The British ships were spotted in the pre-dawn hours, yet the first flag demanding surrender wasn’t delivered until late morning, perhaps close to noon, some eight hours after the alarm was first sounded in New London.

Ledyard decided to send out riders to summon reinforcements throughout Groton, Mystic and the rural expanse of North Groton (Ledyard today), a time-consuming endeavor.

Ledyard couldn’t face the British in the linear style used in most battles of the Revolution, out in the open, for his small garrison would face certain and swift destruction.

Instead, he and his officers chose to gamble. Caulkins says “... they expected reinforcements, and were confident if they could hold out for a few hours, the country would pour out its thousands to their rescue.”

Unfortunately, the country did not.

Yet, there were doubts about the integrity of Fort Griswold. Caulkins notes: “The officers of the fort were not unconscious of the weakness of their works, nor of the surpassing skill and discipline, as well as the great superiority of numbers, about to be brought against them.”

Serious doubt also existed among the troops: “... it was not easy to persuade the militia to coop themselves up in stone walls, where they might be hemmed in and butchered by an overwhelming force.” (Caulkins)

Some of the early reinforcements that did arrive, but held off, declaring: “We will fight to the last gasp if we can have fair play, but we will not throw away our lives by fighting against such odds, with no chance to escape.” (Caulkins)

The democratic Colonel Ledyard conferred with his officers, and though they were surely aware of the use of guerrilla tactics at Lexington and throughout the colonies, they seemed confident in the timely arrival of reinforcements, and a possible chance of success.

One professional historian told me the fort couldn’t afford to lose its artillery to the enemy. But cannon can be spiked (rendered inoperable), and what’s more important: artillery or 80-plus human lives and their extended families?

He also advised that their strategy was “sound enough.” He felt that if they had chosen a guerrilla defense, “The Americans would have been swept away, and the attempt would have proved ineffectual.”

Which is exactly what happened anyway, turning Groton into a fatherless ghost town.

Unfortunately, whether he considered other options or not, Colonel William Ledyard placed his bets on reinforcements that never came, and paid the ultimate price.

John Steward lives in Waterford. He can be reached at tossinglines@gmail.com.